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I.  Introduction  
 
In many countries non-industrial private forestry (NIPF) has special political arrangements in 
order to fulfill social demands and objectives. Traditionally silvicultural and forestry 
infrastructure improvement investments and increasingly environmental objectives are 
promoted. In Finland, the traditional forestry financing policy has been based principally on 
cost-sharing, where public financing has been allocated to those NIPF owners, who also are 
investing given own share of investment costs. 
 
Since 1960's, increasing investments into forestry has been seen as a growth factor for 
Finnish economy (see Juurola et al. 1999). In addition to projected increase in future timber 
supply, financial assistance to silvicultural investments and infrastructure building has 
indirectly supported technological development for more extensive harvesting. This has 
benefited welfare especially in those rural areas, where forest industrial plants are located. 
 
Public cost-sharing instruments have been many and extensive. Financial assistance for NIPF 
owners have been given in forms of grants and soft loans. Financing zones defining the cost-
sharing measure-level percentages have been employed in order to alleviate timber 
production profitability differences inside the country. This means, northern Finland with 
lower growth and yield and longer rotations has received greater share of cost-sharing than 
southern Finland. Also site productivity taxation instruments have been employed in 
promoting NIPF owners investments. All these financial instruments have been supported 
with technical assistance, of which forest work planning costs are considered directly grants 
for NIPF owners, and information costs like advisory services and forest planning as costs of 
extension. 
 
Today, all NIPF owners are eligible for cost-sharing, if measure-related assistance conditions 
are fulfilled. In past decades, also forest owner income characteristics and forest estate size 
restrictions have also been employed in cost-sharing eligibility. Although social status 
restrictions were alleviated in time, it was not earlier than with Forest Improvement Law of 
1987, when only characteristics of eligible supporting work target mattered for cost-sharing 
eligibility of NIPF owners. 
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 The beneficiaries of public financing, NIPF owners have been since long time practically 
only agricultural producers, living in rural areas. However, since 1970's these connections 
have been in major change. Today, farmers own only 33 percents of forest area and their 
share of forest owners is even less, 22 percents. These shares are still decreasing. Due to high 
average age (57 years) and proportion of retired forest owners (37%), majority of NIPF 
owners still live in rural areas, but the next forest ownership generation will be in greater 
shares living in urban areas. (Karppinen et al. 2002) 
 
Cost-sharing results seem to have been succesful, if time-series of investment total financing 
shares are regarded (see e.g. Finnish Statistical Yearbook of Forestry 2003). However, the 
focus of the present study, NIPF owners investment behaviour indicated by these time series 
has not been properly analysed. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse non-industrial private forest owners' investment 
behaviour with regard to public cost-sharing opportunity. The research questions can be set as 
follows: First, if public agent desires to increase certain forestry investments of NIPF, how 
this cost-sharing input will increase total supply of forest owners' own investment funding 
share? In this context, it must be kept in mind, that a great deal of NIPF investments are 
carried out outside the cost-sharing policy, and substitution between private and public 
funding may take place. Second, which is the opposite case, if private agent, a NIPF owner, 
desides to invest into forestry, how much he/she will demand for public cost-share funding? 
This also depends much on the availability of public funds and possible restrictions set in the 
funding policy. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. In Chapter II, background literature and a theoretical 
model is presented. In Chapter III, we introduce time series on Finnish NIPF owner 
investments, values of public and private cost-shares, the econometric model for analysing 
the demand for and supply of cost-sharing parts; and finally the results of the econometric 
model. Conclusions and discussion are followed finally in Chapter IV. 
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II. The economics of public cost sharing of private forest investments  
 
II. 1. Background 
 
Economic theory often treats economic subsidies and aid as harmful and distorting. In general 
equilibrium setting it is hard to defend Pareto efficient subsidies. The second best solutions 
are typically found. In partial setting subsidies can be motivated by positive externality, scale 
and allocation effects. Typically regional or industry specific employment and investment 
subsidies are introduced to promote more even economic growth and development. 
Theoretically investment subsidies are shown to be more efficient than employment subsidies 
(Flam et al. 1983, Fuest and Huber 2000). However, in non-competitive market conditions 
non-harmful factor substitution and incentive effects of subsidies can be eloborated (Holden 
and Swales 1995, Pennings 2000). The case of direct public fund subsidy or aid to private 
investment funding is not much analysed case. Wren (1996) shows that fund substitution 
depend crucially on the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital in the 
without–subsidy position, and on the nature of any amount and rate constraints on the 
assistance contract. The position of full substitution is hard to defend, but the case of partial 
substitution is relevant.  
 
In forest economics the number of detailed papers on forest investment cost-share programs 
have been few. The general economic effects of public aid on forest investments and cuttings 
were analyzed, both theoretically and empirically, by Linden and Leppänen (2003a). Public 
financial assistance has clear positive investment incentive effects among the Finnish NIPF 
owners. In Linden and Leppänen (2003b) the substitution between private funding of 
investments and public aid was analyzed in details. In some special cases complementarities 
were not ruled out. Model predictions were tested with aggregate data from Finland in years 
1963-2000. Some substitution of assisted private funding for non-assisted private funding 
was found. Boyd (1984) shows that the financial assistance part of the cost sharing program 
to forest owners affects capital improvement more than the decision to harvest mature timber. 
However, the investment effects of cost sharing programs are positive. De Steiguer (1984) 
finds, using panel data from USA southern states in period 1964-1979, that government cost-
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sharing payments do not affect the private autonomous tree planting expenditures of NIPF 
investors (see also Brooks 1985, Royer 1987 and Cohen 1983).  
 
II. 2. The Model  
 
Since the forest investment are costly and slowly maturing the socially optimal level of 
investments is not warranted. The relative low return of forest capital (i.e. the forest trees and 
land) makes alternative investment projects more attractive than wood production. Small or 
fractioned woodlot areas create also disincentives for larger infrastructure investments. In 
order to sustain the socially optimal level of wood supply the government must finance the 
private forest investors. Generally the incentive structure has been one wherein, once the 
private forest owner starts his forest investment project, the government will in selected cases 
support and partly cover the financial costs.  
 
Assume that forest owner can increase and improve his forest stock  with investments and 
forest management in forest capital. In this context we define forest capital input as methods 
which improve the forest stand and soil. This type of investments include preparation for 
natural and artificial regeneration, seeding and planting, tending of seedling stands, forest 
fertilization and forest drainage. Some investments reduce harvesting costs, e.g. construction 
and improvement of forest roads.  
S
 
Abstracting from stock growth and other input effects for sake of simplicity we assume that  
stock is a concave production function of capital  input (investments), i.e.   K
 
                                              S f  ( ),    with 0 and 0.K KKK f f= > <
 
The price of investment goods  is given to the forest owner. The financing of investment in 
forest capital is undertaken with private funds 
q
R  and government assistance program that has 
two parts: a lump sum transfer B  and fixed share rate rule Rα  where 0 1α< < . The forest 
owner can choose a combination of levels of and B R . The cost sharing programme has a 
fixed upper limit W
_
:
_
B R W Rα+ ≤ < . Thus, the provided cost sharing is always less than the 
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private funding of investment project. The sharing rule contains an incentive structure for the 
forest investor since assistance is ruled out if 
_
R W≤ . For example if the sharing rule is 
, and private funding is only 50 without the rule, then the investor rises his 
share with the rule at least to 100 and his optimal assistance is 75
0.25 100B R+ ≤
0.25x100 100+ =
0.25x200 100
. The total 
investment is now 200. However if the private funding without the sharing program is 
already at the level of 200 then the investor may choose 50+ =
.r
and 
, i.e. his lump 
sum assistance is less than in the above case with less private investment. This is hardly a 
optimal case since he/she can get the maximum assistance with less private funding. The 
example shows the difficulties involved with the cost sharing programmes. Fixing the lump 
sum assistance at the some level for every investor will not solve the problem since 
maximum assistance is always obtained only with one value of private investment.   
_
B R
R
( , )C B R
 
Generally the positive incentive effects of cost sharing programmes are valid only if  the level 
of  subsidy W  is high enough, i.e. the positive incentive effects for investment dominates in 
average. However, this is not warranted as the following analysis based on the optimal 
investment  conditions will show. 
 
The private funding is provided by the loan markets with interest rate  The cost sharing rule 
entails still that forest owner can choose an optimal mix of  in order to maximize the 
net gain of his investment project subject to cost sharing rules, i.e.  
 
                                             
,
_
_
max ( ) ( , )
. .   (1 )
0
.
B R
f K C R B
s t qK B
B R W
R W
α
α
−
= + +
≤ + ≤
>
 
 
 is a convex or a linear cost function of provided public and private funds. Naturally 
 The marginal private cost of public R0,  C 0 with 0 and 0.B r r s C r= > − > = ≥RR RC s= ≥
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funds is close to zero for the private investor but the marginal cost of private funds is 
positive. If the private lenders are risk averse the private interest rate incorporates a risk 
premium which increases with private funding costs ( . If C0) sRr > BB B=  exists, this means 
that the private marginal cost of public funding is increasing with level of funding. The 
assumption is reasonable, when the increasing part of the auditing and monitoring cost of 
public funding is paid by the private forest owner. Typically 0 and B Bs C 0R RBC= = =
0BR
. In the 
following the analysis is conducted using only the assumption RBC C= =
B R
.  
_
[ ]W( , )B R λ α− −+
/ 0=
_
W− 0.R =Bλ α−
( )s 0− − =
 
The Lagrange of the problem is  
 
                               ( , ) ([ (1 ) ] / )L B R f B R q Cα= + + −  
 
The first order conditions are  
 
                                   
1
/ 0          
K R
K
B
L R f C
q
fL B C
q
α αλ
λ
+∂ ∂ = − −
∂ ∂ = − − =
  
 
                                     
_
/ 0
[ ] 0        
L W B R
W B R
λ α
λ α
∂ ∂ = − − ≥ − − =
 
The forest owner uses all cost sharing funds because the involved marginal cost is close to 
zero, i.e.  
  
                                     0 :    0 and KB
fC s s
q
= ≥ = − >  
 
Solving for λ  from the first order conditions give  
                                                   (1 ) KK R
ff C
q q
α α+ −  . 
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 Noting that C  the optimal investment rule is  R = r
 
                                                           ( )Kf q r s qrα= − <  
 
i.e. marginal product of forest investment equals the assisted user cost of investment. Note 
that Kf qr<  means higher level of investments than without the public cost sharing.  
 
In order to analyse the comparative static effects between private funding and forms of public 
funding the optimal investment condition Kf qr q sα= −  is first totally differentiated holding 
 fixed  and q B
 
                                          (1 )KK KK RR
Rf d f dR qC dR qsd
q q
αα α++ = −  
 
                                         ⇒
2
2
( )  
(1 )
KK
KK R
dR f R q s
d fα α
+= − + − Rq C
<0 . 
 
Rising the share rate α  means less private investment if Bs C=  is close to zero and the level 
of private funding R  is high. Note that rate of private risk premium C r  has a 
lowering effect on funding substitution. If investment effects on forest stock are linear 
 and  then  
0RR R= >
( KKf = 0) 0s ≥
 
                                                      0  0KKf
RR
dR s
d Cα = = ≥  
 
and funding substitution will not take place. 
 
The effects of lump sum assistance on private funding is analysed in similar fashion, but now 
 and qα  are hold fixed and  
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(1 )
KK KK RR BB
dBf f dR qC dR q C dB
q q
α α++ = −
 
                                      ⇒
2
2
( ) 0.
(1 )
KK BB
KK RR
dR f q C
dB f q C
α
α
+= − <+ −  
 
The result is close to above with share rate but the substitution between  and B R  now does 
not depend on the level of .R  Thus dR / /d dR dBα < . Note that when  the funding 
substitution disappears 
0KKf =
 
                                                          0 0.KK
BB
f
RR
dR C
dB C
α
= = >  
 
The analysis so far has been based on the assumption that the cost share rule is binding, i.e.  
_
[ ]W B Rλ α− − = 0  with 0λ > . Next we analyse the fund substitution case with non-binding 
rule 
_
B R Wα+ < . The case is a plausible alternative in this context, since quite often forest 
owner lacks incentive for forest investments or simply because in many cases any larger 
forest investment possibilities do no exist. The forest owner may also have income 
constraints that lowers his private investment possibilities. In all these cases the forest owner 
participate only partly in cost sharing program or he/she may do not participate at all in it. 
There are also evidence, which may partly support this kind of behaviour in Finland, since in 
many years some public funding is left over, i.e. all public funds targeted to support and 
boost the private forest investments are not used.  
 
In this case the analysis of the first order conditions is  
 
                                                 
1/ 0
/ 0          
K
K
L R f r
q
fL B s
q
α+ ∂ ∂ = − =
∂ ∂ = − =
 . 
 
The funding substitution formulas are now for and R α  
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2
2 2
(1 ) (1 )
K KK KK
d R
RRf f d f dR C dRq q q
α α αα+ ++ + =  
                                    ⇒ 2 2( (1  (1 )
K KK ) )
KK R
dR qf f R
d f Rq C
α
α α
+ += − + − . 
 
For  and R B  we get  
                                              2 2
1 (1 )
KK KK BBf dB f dR C dBq q
α++ =
 
                                          ⇒
2( )  0.
(1 )
KK BB
KK
dR f q C
dB fα
−= − <+  
 
The sign of /dR d  α  is not generally certain, but under assumption 0  KKf = we obtain  
 
                                                  0  0KK
K
f
RR
dR f
d qCα = = > . 
 
The analysis above has shown that the funding substitution outcome is not always valid case 
when public financial support to forest owners increases. Irrespectively of binding of public 
cost sharing constraint the public support increases private funding on investments if the 
stock effects from investments are almost linear ( 0)KKf ≈  and if marginal costs of public and 
private funding are increasing with the funding levels ( ).  0 and 0BBC C> >RR
 
III.  Econometric analysis  
 
III. 1 Data and model specification  
Our panel data consists of regional observation of 19 Forestry Board districts in Finland in 
years 1983-2000. In 1996, an forestry organisational reform took place changing the regional 
areas, and new 13 Forestry Centre regions were converted to preceding districts. Following 
variables are used: 
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                        PRIVfunds  = private total costs of forest investments (million euros)  
                       PUBfunds  = government investment grants and loans to private  
                                             forest investors (million euros) 
                         INCOME = private forest owners’ income from wood selling measured 
                                            as a value of timber sales contracts (million euros) 
                                      i = nominal interest rate of commercial bank loans (%)  
                              HECT = total forest area affected by forest investments (in hectares) 
                                    Pe = one period ahead market price expectations (euros/m3 
                                             over bark)  
 
Corresponding observations, except for the interest rates, for these variables are obtained 
from Finnish Statistical Yearbooks of Forestry, published by Finnish Forest Research 
Institute. The price expectations were derived from time series models of regional 
stumpage market prices. The conducted theoretical analysis above does not allow for any 
detailed formal model how the private and public funding of private forest investments 
are related to each other. However the derived theory implications can be tested with 
following two equation system describing the supply of private investment funds and 
demand for public funds  
 
Supply of private funds  
 
                       PRIVfunds = f(PUBfunds, INCOME, i, HECT, Pe) 
                                                   (-)              (+)      (-)    (+)    (+) 
 
Demand for public funds  
 
                        PUBfunds = g(PRIVfunds, INCOME, i, HECT, Pe) 
                                                   (+)             (-)         (+)   (+)    (-) 
 
The signs under the variables indicate the effects of variables on the endogenous 
variables. The model treats both the private and the public funding of forest investments 
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as endogenous variable. The level of supply of private funds PRIVfunds is partly 
determined by the public funding since this is the target of public cost sharing programs. 
However, the theory predictions derived above indicate that fund substitution is the most 
expected alternative, i.e. increase in public share of funding decreases supply of private 
funds. The demand for public funds, PUBfunds, is also endogenous since the level of 
public funds distributed by the state is conditioned by the increased level of private 
investment. In this case we can not assume that private funds are substituted for public 
funds. Note that this result does not either contradict our theory implications.  
 
Incomes obtained by the forest owners in form of wood selling have a positive effect on 
supply of private funding of investments. However, the income effect on public funding 
is assumed to be negative. High forest incomes reduce the need of public investment 
support. The total forest area affected by forest investments is the scale variable in the 
system. Large investment areas imply increasing investment funds. However, the 
financing of investment with bank loans has a negative effect on investment, i.e. high 
loan interest rates decrease the supply of private investment funds. The commercial 
interest rate effects on public funding are positive indicating the effects of increased costs 
of private funds. The price expectations of stumpage market prices increase the private 
investment funds since next period’s incomes are expected to higher than in current 
period. Increasing expected incomes allows for larger investments and less public 
support. 
 
Next we assume that the above system can be linearized and the following fixed regional 
effects panel model of demand for and supply of investment funds is estimable with least 
squares methods  
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0 1
2 3 4 5
0 1
2 3 4 5
1 2 3
                        
1 2 3
                      
      
it i it
it it it it it
it i it
it it it it it
PRIVfunds a D D D a PUBfunds
a INCOME a i a HECT a Pe
PUBfunds b D D D b PRIVfunds
b INCOME b i b HECT b Pe
ε
η
= + + + + +
+ + +
= + + + + +
+ + + +
      1, 2,...,19 (regions) and 1,...,18 (1983-2000).i t= =
+
 
Regional specific fixed effects a  allow for regional differences in fund supply and 
demand. 
it
 and it itε η  normally and independently distributed errors.  
 
The estimated equations include three dummy variables that describe price agreements 
and forest tax changes during the analysed period. The dummy variables are defined as  
 
   D1 =  dummy variable for collective timber price agreements in period 1979-1990  
   D2 =  dummy starting in year 1993 for transition in forest income taxation system  
   D3 =  regional percentages of alternative forest tax formulas adopted since year 1993. 
 
The Finnish tax system for NIPF owners changed in 1993. The forest owner was forced to 
choose, in the transition period of 1993-2005, between the old system based on the owned 
forest area (site-productivity tax) and the new system based on the income from wood 
selling (wood sales profit tax). 
 
All the nominal price variables were changed to real prices by dividing them by the cost-
of-living index. Interest rates (100 )xi were adjusted with the inflation rate to obtain real 
interest rates. All variables except interest rate and dummies D1-D3 were logarithmically 
transformed.   
 
The model system above is estimated with instrumental variable method (2SLS) since 
both equations include an endogenous variable as explanatory variable. Using OLS 
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method would lead to inconsistent and biased parameter estimates. Note that the above 
model is in the structural model form. The reduced form of model entails that the total 
effects of exogenous variables are affected by the feedback effects of endogenous 
variables. The reduced form is obtained in following way (abstracting from fixed regional 
and dummy effects) 
 
                            2 3 4 51
2 3 4 51
1
1
INCOME
a a a aa PRIVfunds i
b b b bb PUBfunds HECT
Pe
  −       =      −        
 
 
               ⇒  
 
                         
1
2 3 4 51
2 3 4 51
1
1
INCOME
a a a aaPRIVfunds i
b b b bbPUBfunds HECT
Pe
−
  −      =      −        
 
 
 
Next we estimate the model using all the regions at same time and separate models for 
Forestry Board districts in southern and northern Finland. All exogenous variables including 
dummies are used as instruments. However the equation identification needs that at least one 
exogenous variable must be excluded from each equation. The excluded variable has to be 
different in each equation. This means that some of coefficients in vectors 
 must be zero (for more details, see Greene 2000, chapter 16).  2 5 2 5' ( .... ) and ' ( .... )a a a b b b= =
 
III. 2 Results  
 
The models are first estimated with fixed effects OLS without the endogenous variables on 
the right hand side. This gives us some preliminary information concerning the importance of 
postulated exogenous variables. The results in Table 1 show that model estimates are well-
determined and most of parameter signs are as expected. The collective price agreements in 
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period 1979-1990 (dummy D1) had positive investment funding effects. However the 
introduction of wood sales profit taxation alternative starting in 1993 (D2) seems to lower the 
funding in forest investments but the coverage of this new tax system (D3) has a positive 
impact on investment funds. However the total tax effects are positive and they are stronger 
on demand for public funds than on supply of private funds. The causes of opposite signed 
tax effects is analysed in details in future research work.  
 
Table 1. Fixed effects LS-estimates for models of private funds (PRIVfunds) 
              and public cost sharing funds (PUBfunds) of investments in Finland.  
              342 observation: N=19 forest board districts, T =18 years 1983-2000  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                   PRIVfunds          PUBfunds  
                                                  Exogenoues              estimate               estimate 
                                                   Variable                    t-value                t-value 
 
 
                                                  
1
2
3
D
D
D
INCOME
i
HECT
PE
                               
0.295*
(3.06)
0.664*
( 2.92)
1.101*
(3.17)
0.236*
(22.67)
0.137*
( 2.52)
0.318*
(10.54)
0.264*
( 2.29)
−
−
−
−
−
−
0.269
(1.57)
0.923*
( 2.35)
1.341*
(2.34)
0.088*
( 4.77)
0.031
(0.24)
1.302*
(24.34)
0.071
( 0.39)
−
−
−
−
−
−
 
                                                 181.09                   
2
2  (18)
R
fixed effects
p value
χ
−
0.778
(0.00)
0.662
53.86
(0.00)
 
                                                               *) statistically significant at 5% level  
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Private forest incomes increase the private funds supply with rate of 0.24% but lower the 
demand for public funds. However the exact elasticity value of latter (-0.088) is not 
significant in economic terms. The negative interest rate effects on private funds are not 
negligible since a 10% increase in commercial loan interest rates decreases private funding 
with 1.4%. Interest rate effects lack statistical significance on public funds. Investment area 
(variable HECT) effects are large especially on the public funds demand. A 10% increase in 
invested area increases public funding with 13%. The corresponding elasticity for private 
funding is only 3.2%. The difference between these estimates is interesting. Private 
investment may be more cost-effective than public financed investments. The difference may 
reflect also the fact that alternative forms of investment funds are used in different purposes. 
Higher price expectations on stumpage market prices decrease the supply of private funding 
on investment. The reason for the found negative effect may lie in the regressive investment 
behaviour of private forest owners. Investments are financed only with realized incomes, not 
with expected incomes. No effects are found on public funding. Thus the proposed positive 
income effect is rejected. 
 
Generally, results in Table 1 are promising since many variables enter in equations with 
statistical significance and have proper economic interpretation. The coefficient of 
determination, R2, is reasonable high for both equations. No autocorrelation or hetero-
skedasticity were found in residuals. Tests for no fixed regional effects are rejected in both 
equations. Thus regional differences exist in forest investment funding. Regional dummies 
were positive in private funding equation but they were negative in public funding equation.  
 
In the next stage we estimate the two equation model system with 2SLS method because the 
endogenous variables are now included on the right hand side of equations. The equation 
identification needs that some variables are excluded from the models. In this context, we 
exclude variable HECT from equation for PRIVfunds and variables i and Pe from equation 
for PUBfunds. Also the dummy variables D1-D3 were excluded from the latter equation since 
in the preliminary estimation non-exclusion caused some estimation instability. Note that all 
exogenous variables were included in instrument set.  
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           Table 2. Fixed effects 2SLS-estimates for models of private funds (PRIVfunds) 
                          and public cost sharing funds (PUBfunds) of investments in Finland.        
________________________________________________________________________________ 
                               PRIVfunds   PUBfunds           PRIVfunds   PUBfunds      PRIVfunds   PUBfunds 
                                     Whole  country                       Southern  Finland              Northern Finland 
                                       N=19,  T=18                              N=15, T=18                       N=4, T =18 
        Exogenoues      estimate       estimate                estimate      estimate         estimate      estimate 
          Variable           t-value         t-value                  t-value         t-value          t-value         t-value 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1
2
3
PUBfunds
PRIVfunds
D
D
D
INCOME
i
HECT
Pe                                                   
0.244*
(10.32)
0.230*
(2.58)
0.417*
( 2.26)
0.683*
(2.52)
0.258*
(23.06)
0.138*
( 2.38)
0.247*
( 1.94)
−
−
−
−
−
−
1.232*
(6.20)
0.378*
( 7.42)
0.912*
(11.49)
−
−
0.245*
(9.18)
0.206*
(1.96)
0.515*
( 1.78)
0.831*
(2.01)
0.256*
(19.80)
0.087
(1.15)
0.141
( 0.89)
−
−
−
−
−
1.051*
(3.65)
0.340*
( 5.33)
1.003*
(8.17)
−
−
0.190*
(3.92)
0.243*
(2.21)
0.043
( 0.38)
0.061
(0.16)
0.295*
(12.78)
0.285*
( 4.21)
0.511*
( 3.46)
−
−
−
−
−
−
0.943*
(1.75)
0.311*
( 1.68)
0.819*
(8.34)
−
−
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
             2R                 0.748             0.529                    0.685         0.599                  0.863         0.324 
    
              *) statistically significant at 5% level  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 2 gives the results from instrumental method estimation for the panel models that 
include all Forestry Board districts. Separate models were estimated also for southern Finland 
(15 districts) and northern Finland (4 districts). Some differences in investment behaviour 
among private forest owners are expected in southern and northern Finland. The climate and 
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soil conditions are quite different in these regions. Also the age structure of the forests are 
different. In southern Finland trees on average reach their financial maturity much younger 
than in northern Finland. The public share of investment funding is also higher in the north. 
 
The results in Table 2 for exogenous variables are quite close the ones found in Table 1. 
above except for the negative income effects on public funds demand are now significant in 
economic terms also. The parameter estimates are now close to –0.35. The tax effects on 
private supply of funds are not found in northern Finland. The price expectations and interest 
rate effects on private funds are larger in northern Finland than in southern Finland.  
 
The most striking result concerns the funding substitution hypothesis. The results reject the 
hypothesis. Table 2 shows that no substitution is found. Private and public funding of 
investments are related to each other complementary. However the relationships between 
them are not symmetric. The elasticities of public funds in private funds supply equation lie 
between values 0.19-0.25 but the private fund elasticities of public funds demand are between 
values 0.94-1.24. Thus a 10% increase in private investment funding increases public funding 
demand with same rate but 10% increase of public funds increases private funds supply in 
average only with 2.4%. The latter result is partly understandable also from the point that 
private funding share is twice as large as the public share The effects are somewhat higher in 
southern Finland than in northern Finland. The found elasticities values and endogeneity of 
both funding forms mean that if exogenous causes for investment are not allowed for, the 
investment funding would die out.  
 
Regional differences are not great between the forms of investment funding but some greater 
disparities are found among the exogenous variables, when the model results above are 
converted in the reduced model form. Table 3 gives the reduced form parameterisation with 
whole country, southern and northern Finland estimates. The reduced income effects on  
public funds demand are insignificant regardless the region analysed. Income effects on 
private funding supply are quite similar across the regions. 10% increase in private forest 
incomes increase the private funding on investment with rate of 2.3% in southern Finland and 
2.9% in northern Finland. The reduced interest rate effects are more significant in northern 
 18
Finland and the effect are more severe with public funding. Investment area effects on public 
funding are especially large in northern Finland. The reduced price expectations effects are  
 
                       Table 3. Reduced form estimates for exogenous variables  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                 
0.237 0.197 0.318 0.353
0.085 0.243 1.304 0.435
0.233 0.117 0.331 0.189
0.095 0.123 1.351 0.199
0.287 0.3
INCOME i HECT Pe
PRIVfunds
PUBfunds
PRIVfunds
PUBfunds
PRIVfunds
− −
− − −
− −
− − −
−
Whole country
outhern Finland
Northern Finland
47 0.189 0.622
0.039 0.327 0.998 0.587PUBfunds
−
− − −
S
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
three times larger in northern Finland compared with findings in southern Finland. A 10% 
increase of price expectations decrease investment funding in average 6% in northern 
Finland. The reduced form estimates show that the investment funding in northern Finland is 
much more sensitive to exogenous interest rate and price expectation shocks than in southern 
Finland. Note that some uncertainty is contained in these estimates since some parameter 
estimates in Table 2 were quite imprecise.  
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
A model of public cost sharing of non-industrial private forest investment was proposed to 
describe the optimal choice between the private financing of investments and public 
investment assistance. The public support consisted of a lump sum transfer and fixed share 
rate rule of private funds. The  NIPF owner optimized his private funding with respect to 
sharing contract. The government actions and choices were given as exogenous. The fund 
substitution depends on the curvature conditions of forest investment and funding cost 
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functions. If the stock effects from investments are almost linear and if marginal costs of 
public and private funding are increasing with the funding levels, the fund substitution is not 
present. In more general cases substitution is present. The model does not allow for structural 
testing of fund substitution hypothesis, but helps us to interpret empirical results.  
 
Simultaneous econometric model for private and public funding with forest revenue taxes, 
forest incomes, interest rates, investment scale, and market wood price expectations as 
exogenous variables was estimated.  Finnish regional data in period 1983-2000 was used. The 
2SLS estimation results rejected the substitution alternative. A 10% increase in private 
investment funding increases public funding demand with same rate but a 10% increase of 
public funds increases the private funds supply 2.4%. From budget expenditure point of view, 
also other instruments than public grants and loans increasing private funding are therefore 
worth of further research and development. Significant income effects are found only for 
private funding. In northern Finland investment scale effects are large for public financial 
assistance.  
 
The results imply that government cost-sharing investment programmess have been incentive 
supporting. They have increased, not “crowded out”, the private investments. Linden & 
Leppänen (2003a) showed also that cost-sharing has led to increased cuttings during the 
analyzed period. However, the question of opportunity costs and stocks effects of government 
funding remains to be analyzed. Thus, cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness of cost 
sharing programs should be analyzed in more details before the final merits of government 
investment support programmes can be evaluated. 
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